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The Threat to Judicial
Independence
JUDGE ROBERT A. SPRECHER*
The crucial problem of inadequate judicial compensation has be-
come a crisis.
In the first place, any complaint about salary is likely to fall upon
deaf ears at any time, particularly when the listener is fighting his own
battle against the grinding vise of inflation and recession and when the
complainant is already being paid something like $42,500 a year.
Secondly, the listener, if he had ever been listening, most certainly
stopped doing so when he heard that Congress had "sneaked through"
a cost-of-living raise for judges as well as for congressmen and others
on July 30, 1975.
Having ceased paying any attention, he probably doesn't realize
that the increase was 5 percent when 50 percent would not have been
compensatory from a strictly cost-of-living standpoint. Therefore he
cannot be blamed for not understanding that what is at stake is not
simply a bad personal economic situation for some individual judges,
but rather the very independence and competence of the judicial system.
If he understands this, does the average citizen want this to happen or
can he afford to let such circumstances persist?
THE FAILURE OF CONGRESS TO IMPLEMENT THE SALARY
COMMISSION'S RECOMMENDATIONS
The salaries of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches were
separately considered and fixed by Congress until 1967,' when Con-
gress established the Commission on Executive, Legislative and Judicial
Salaries' to be composed of nine members, three, including the chair-
man, to be appointed by the President, two to be appointed by the Presi-
* United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
1 At no time prior to 1969 were congressional and judicial salaries tied together:
Judicial Salary Congressional Salary
1911 $ 7,000 $ 7,500
1919 8,500 7,500
1926 12,500 10,000
1946-47 17,500 12,500
1955 25,500 22,500
1964-65 33,000 30,000
(Courts of appeals judges' salaries; district court judges' salaries are slightly lower.)
2 2 U.S.C. § 351 (1970).
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dent of the Senate, two by the Speaker of the House, and two by the
Chief Justice of the United States.'
The Commission, authorized to appoint an executive director and
additional personnel,4 and to be provided by the Administrator of Gen-
eral Services with administrative support services,5 was authorized to
recommend to the President changes in salaries for some 2,800 officials
in the three branches of government.6
The first commission was to be appointed for the 1969 fiscal year
(July 1968-June 1969), was scheduled to report to the President before
January 1, 1969,1 and actually made its report in December 1968. In
regard to the judiciary, the recommendations were as follows:
1968 Salary Recommendation
Chief Justice $40,000 $67,500
Associate Justice 39,500 65,000
Courts of Appeal Judges 33,000 50,000
District Courts Judges 30,000 47,500
Under the act the President was to submit his recommendation to the
Congress with his submission of the budget,8 to become effective in
March. President Johnson reduced the commission-recommended sal-
aries respectively to $62,500; $60,000; $42,500; and $40,000; and Con-
gress readily accepted these recommendations, as well as comparable
executive increases and congressional salary increases from $30,000 to
$42,500, all of which became effective in March 1969.
The commission was to be reactivated by new appointments every
fourth fiscal year following the 1969 fiscal year. This was designed to
permit the President to act upon the commission's recommendations,
and to allow Congress to act upon the President's recommendations,
shortly after each presidential election and well in advance of the next
election (and in fact a year prior to the between-term congressional
elections). However, President Nixon delayed naming his appointees
to the fiscal 1973 salary commission until it was too late for recom-
mendations to be submitted to Congress in the non-election calendar
year of 1973.
The second (or 1973) commission made its recommendations on
June 30, 1973. A majority of the commission recommended an across-
3 2 U.S.C. § 352(1) (1970).
4 2 U.S.C. § 353(a) (1970).
G2 U.S.C. §355 (1970).
6 2 U.S.C. § 357 (1970).
7Id.
8 2 U.S.C. § 358 (1970).
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the-board increase of 25 percent on all executive, legislative, and judi-
cial salaries, except for smaller increases for Cabinet Secretaries, and
the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court. The
recommendations for the judiciary were respectively $72,500; $70,000;
$53,000; and $50,000.' Two members of the commission concluded
that "the greatest need is some relief for Federal judges"' 0 but declined
to recommend increases for any federal official. Three other members
concurred in the 25 percent increase but dissented from the failure to
recommend increases of at least 30 percent. These three commission
members made a telling argument for the plight of the judiciary."
The majority of the commission also recommended the establish-
ment of a biennial commission so that all executive, legislative, and judi-
cial salaries could be kept under current consideration. 2
9 REPORT OF SECOND COM siSSoN ON ExEcuTIVE, LEGISLATiVE AND JUDICIAL SALARIES
14 (June 30, 1973).
10 Id. at 16.
11 It is essential that among the appointees to the Judiciary, there be a substantial
number of the most able and talented young men and women. Yet, these are the
very persons who are least able to make the financial sacrifice which leaving the
Bar and ascending to the Bench involves today. Anyone who has been connected
with judicial selection knows how many times recruitment of the most qualified
lawyers among those available for judicial appointment is frustrated by their in-
ability to accept the financial sacrifice that is entailed. We are sure we need not
emphasize that compensation is not the primary attraction for those who aspire to
judicial service. There is the prestige of the judge, the opportunity for enriching
and rewarding service in pursuit of the highest aspiration of a people-justice under
law. But judges have family obligations, too; children who go to college, all the
economic pressures of a mounting economy. A differential, even a substantial dif-
ferential, between earnings of the lawyer of ability and the judge of ability is to
be expected, and judges do not complain of this. But the differential should not
be allowed to become so great that it becomes intolerable.
A Federal judgeship is a lifetime appointment. Under prevailing standards of
judicial conduct, the judge gives up virtually all opportunity for outside income.
Yet, he must maintain a standard of living consistent with his position. Under
these circumstances, he is especially hard bit if, when his salary is finally reviewed,
the disproportion he already suffers as compared with his counterpart in private
practice, is aggravated by failure to afford him even the percentage increases en-
joyed by everyone else except his fellow sufferers in the Congress and the Execu-
tive branch.
We are faced with grave consequences growing out of the current situation.
In the first place, recruitment of the kind of judges all of us want to see on the
Bench is becoming more difficult; and now again, as in 1953 when the first Com-
mission met, we are faced by the spectre of resignations of judges who simply
cannot subject their families any longer to the financial pressures of the situation.
We do not mean to indicate that if the increase were to be 25 percent rather than
30 percent, there would be a general exodus from the Bench. But there would be
a lowering of morale; and there would be an increasing realization on the part of
the kind of lawyers we want to attract to the Bench that challenging and inspiring
as judicial service is and great as might be the financial sacrifice they would be
willing to make, the future is simply too bleak to permit the sacrifice entailed for
them and their families.
Id. at 20-21.
12 Id. at 14-15.
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
President Nixon, instead of accepting the immediate 25 percent in-
crease recommended by the second commission, recommended to Con-
gress a 7.5 percent annual increase for each of the following three years.
This would have represented for courts of appeals judges, for example,
a salary of $45,700 for 1974, $49,100 for 1975, and $52,800 for 1976.
Unfortunately, the recommendations came one year later than was origi-
nally anticipated when the statute creating the commission system was
enacted. Instead of coming shortly after the 1972 presidential election
in early 1973, the recommendations were made in early 1974, an elec-
tion year. The Senate defeated the recommendations on March 6, 1974,
and barred all salary raises by a 72 to 26 vote.' 3 The reason was
simple: Congress was fearful of increasing its own salary in an elec-
tion year.
THE WAVE OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL RESIGNATIONS
For almost a year after the debacle of the second commission's
efforts Congress did nothing. As a result an alarming and record num-
ber of federal judges resigned and newspapers throughout the country
became concerned, evidencing their concern by editorial comment. It is
now widely-known that seven federal judges resigned within a 12-month
period in 1973-74 14 for economic reasons"5 and that this number repre-
sented more federal judges than had resigned for economic reasons in
all of the previous 34 years.' 6
In March 1975, Mr. Chief Justice Burger met with the President
and congressional leaders and told them that there were 14 to 20 addi-
tional federal judges who had indicated that they were considering re-
13 N.Y. Times, March 7, 1974, at 1.
14 Three more federal judges have since resigned, making the total ten:
Age at
Judge Sworn Resigned Resignation
Thomas A. Masterson (E.D. Pa.) 1967 1973 45
Hiram R. Cancio (D.P.R.) 1965 1974 53
Sidney 0. Smith, Jr. (N.D. Ga.) 1965 1974 50
David L. Middlebrooks, Jr. (N.D. Fla.) 1970 1974 48
Arnold Bauman (S.D.N.Y.) 1972 1974 60
Anthony T. Augelli (D.N.J.) 1961 1974 72
Anthony J. Travia (E.D.N.Y.) 1968 1974 63
Harold R. Tyler, Jr. (S.D.N.Y.) 1962 1975 52
James A. Comiskey (E.D. La.) 1967 1975 48
Griffin B. Bell (5th Cir.) 1961 1976 57
15For evidence that the resignations were based primarily on economic reasons, see
Chapin, The Judicial Vanishing Act, 58 Jumc.ATurE 161 (Nov. 1974); N.Y. Times, June 7,
1974, at 40; TImE, February 10, 1975, at 74; Chicago Tribune, April 17, 1975, § 2, at 9;
Chicago Tribune, May 18, 1975, § 1, at 7.
IGlnterview with Chief Justice Burger, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, March 31, 1975,
at 28.
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signing for economic reasons.'7 Equally portentous was the fact that in
one section of the country 15 lawyers declined judicial appointment, 8
and in another area 13 lawyers declined before the fourteenth accepted
an appointment.' 9
Senator Hruska's plea for mediocrity in the judiciary" had been
re-echoed during the heated March 6, 1974 debate by Senator Mike
Mansfield, who as Senate majority leader led the fight to defeat the
1974 proposed raise. Mansfield said on the floor of the Senate that
"there are hundreds of lawyers waiting to take the places of the mem-
bers of the judiciary who are complaining so much" and that "in every
state, lawyers are lined up to take a position in the Federal judiciary."21
Incidentally, the Senate majority leader at that time was paid a salary
of $49,500 instead of the $42,500 paid other congressmen, and received
$3,000 expense funds over and above the amounts received by other
senators.m
A judicial resignation has several severe repercussions. First, there
is often a long lag in filling a vacancy. In the last five fiscal years,
'7 Id. at 28. The Chief Justice added, in regard to the 14 potential resigners:
I had a meeting with the chief judges of the 11 circuits last week to find out
which judges are most likely to be lost by resignation, and a very interesting pro-
file emerged. There are at least 14 of them. The average age is 52. They have an
average of 4.6 children. They are in the upper levels in terms of disposing of cases.
At age 52 they can still go back into the practice of law. There is value in the
prestige of having been a federal judge.
Another factor in the profile is that they are all located in the centers where
the heaviest amount of work exists-in one or other of the 25 metropolitan courts
in which, in the aggregate, 69 percent of all the litigation in federal courts is pending.
By another coincidence, 22 of these 25 large cities are located in one or the
other of 20 States which have raised the compensation of State judges up to or
substantially higher than the compensation of federal judges. That means they are
in communities where we need the ability of these high performers and where the
temptation and opportunities to go back into private practice are maximum. Those
20 States found it necessary to increase salaries in order to keep a strong judicial
system.
Id. at 29-30.
18Matthews, U.S. Judges Hard to Get, Pay Cited, Los Angeles Times, March 10, 1974,
§ 1, at 10.
19 Interview with Chief Justice Burger, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, March 31, 1975,
at 28, 30.
20 On March 16, 1970, the first full day of debate in the Senate upon President Nixon's
nominee, G. Harrold Carsweil, to the Supreme Court, Senator Roman Hruska told the com-
munications media:
Even if he were mediocre, there are a lot of mediocre judges and people and law-
yers. They are entitled to a little representation, aren't they, and a little chance?
We can't have all Brandeises and Frankfurters and Cardozos and stuff like that there.
R. HARRIs, DECISION 110 (1971). Senator Hruska has since labored hard and well as the
Chairman of the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System in efforts
to upgrade that system.
21 N.Y. Times, March 7, 1974, at 1, at 17. Mansfield added that "my heart bleeds" for
federal judges.
22 2 U.S.C. § 31 (1970).
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vacancies in the courts of appeals alone, where there are only 97 active
judgeships, have caused a combined loss of 28 years of judicial service.23
Secondly, it may then take from three to six years before a new judge
reaches the peak of his performance.24 Most of the judges who have
resigned or have threatened to do so had already reached a high level
of performance.
Finally, if the top choices for replacement decline to accept the
appointment, the caliber of the replacement is bound to be increasingly
below that of the judge who resigned. Undoubtedly there are, as Senator
Mansfield said, hundreds of persons of varying competence "waiting in
line" to be appointed. However, the top quality lawyer has neither the
desire nor the economic ability to take on the difficult job at a great
sacrifice in compensation. Nor should the federal courts be manned
primarily by those so affluent that the salary is a matter of indifference
to them. There are undoubtedly dilettante lawyers who would be will-
ing to become dilettante judges. A Boston lawyer wrote in the New
York Times: "As we go to court with everything that ails us, so we
seem to neglect what will happen if we restrict the actual field of judi-
cial aspirants to people who are ailing themselves. 25
But beyond the resignations lurks an even greater possibility for
concern. Not only is the power over a man's subsistence a power over
his will, but constant concern over subsistence tends to erode the com-
petence and then the independence of those who do not resign. Among
those who remain are some who devoutly wish to remain but are tempted
by offers from the private sector.28 There are others who gave up pri-
vate practices to accept the judgeship and whose decision to do so neces-
sarily became irreversible. The practice is now long gone and so are
the clients. It is simple to tell such a judge that "if you're not satisfied,
quit" but to what future does he resign himself? Does not the possi-
23 CO&IrSSION ON REVISION Or TmE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEm, STRUCTURE
AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE 63 (1975).
24 Interview with Chief Justice Burger, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, March 31, 1975,
at 28, 30.25 Higgins, So You Want To Be A Judge?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1975, § 4, at 17.
[I]t's a hell of a lot easier to inform a smart, overworked judge about a case than
it is to tell a dumb, overworked judge, and the result is usually fairer and a lot
quicker, too.
7d.
The Chicago Tribune editorialized:
Every federal judge is a man of vast influence and power. Potentially, each one
is a person of distinction. Let's lift the judges out of the crowd and keep their
positions attractive to people no less distinguished in the future than federal judges
have been in the past.
Chicago Tribune, April 28, 1975, § 2, at 2.
26Letter from an eminent anonymous Federal judge to Senator Percy (R. Ill.), Dec.
24, 1974, in 121 CONG. REc. 1673 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1975).
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bility exist that given a desperate enough situation, subconsciously such
a judge might be tempted to attract the attention and the pleasure of
possible future employers? In any event, job-seekers are not good pres-
ent employees.
Beyond that, judging is, in important part, a meditative occupation
and best performance is induced by a complacent and even-tempered
composure, unruffled by mundane concerns. Economic pressure causes
depression, which affects performance. The hard-worked federal judi-
ciary needs peak performance from unharrassed judges working under
ideal conditions.2
THE FIVE PERCENT INCREASE IN EXECUTIVE,
LEGISLATIVE, AND JUDICIAL SALARIES
Following Chief Justice Burger's March 1975 plea to the Presi-
dent and congressional leaders, Representative Railsback (R. Ill.) intro-
duced a bill on April 17, 1975, which would have increased judicial
salaries by only 20 percent.28 Senator Abourezk (D. S.D.) introduced
a similar bill in the Senate on June 26, 1975.9 About that time, Senator
Percy (R. Ill.) wrote:
I believe that Congress should act immediately to provide a 20 percent
pay increase for federal judges, and also provide for cost of living
increases as appropriate. Furthermore, Congress should provide long-
range salary adjustments so that federal judicial salaries are compa-
rable to those of other federal government career personnel.30
In addition, virtually every newspaper in the United States during 1975
editorially supported, in strong language, substantial increases in judi-
cial salaries.
Instead of acting upon judicial salaries in any meaningful way,
Congress on July 30, 1975, passed the Executive Salary Cost-of-Living
Adjustment Act of 1975,"' which had the effect of taking the 2,SOO
Executive Schedule employees with an annual payroll of about $100
million, who are subject to the Executive, Legislative and Judicial Sal-
aries Act of 1967 (establishing the commission system), 32 and making
27 Higgins, So You Want To Be A Judge?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1975, § 4, at 17,
states: "Those of us who appear before Federal and state judges, and who have a tendency
to talk back, would prefer that they come onto the bench in the morning in the best pos-
sible spirits."
2s H.R. 6150, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
29 S.2040, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975).
30 Percy, Excellence and Efficiency on the Federal Bench, 56 Cm. B. REc. 313, 315
(1975).
31 Pub. L. No. 94-82 (Aug. 9, 1975).
322 U.S.C. §§351-61 (1970).
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them subject also to the annual cost-of-living salary adjustments previ-
ously applied to the 1.3 million white-collar civilian government em-
ployees with an annual payroll of $17 billion on the General Schedule
under the Federal Salary Reform Act of 1962.1' The 1975 Act passed
the Senate 58 to 29 and the House 214 to 213. This action required
that under the Pay Comparability Act of 1970,-" an adjustment in fed-
eral white collar pay was due on October 1, 1975.
On August 29, 1975, President Ford advised Congress that his
"pay agent" and the Advisory Committee on Federal Pay had recom-
mended to him that an 8.66 percent increase was required to achieve
comparability with the private sector, but that since this would add $3.5
billion to federal expenditures, he recommended a 5 percent increase
only, which would reduce this increased expenditure by $1.6 billion. 5
Within 30 legislative days of its submission, either House of Congress
could adopt a resolution disagreeing with the President's 5 percent plan,
which would result in the 8.66 percent increase becoming effective.3
The Senate upheld the President 53 to 39, and the House upheld
him 278 to 123. On October 1, 1975, a 5 percent increase became
effective for the 1.3 million white collar workers and for the judiciary,
congressmen, and top executive officials.
So instead of increasing judicial salaries by 50 percent or even by
20 percent, which public opinion strongly supported, Congress elected
to increase all executive and judicial salaries, as well as congressional
salaries, by 5 percent. By tying its own salary into the cost-of-living
increase Congress provoked a storm of editorial rage.
ADEQUACY OF COMPENSATION RELATED TO INDEPENDENCE
AND COMPETENCE
Among the grievances against George III detailed in the Declara-
tion of Independence were that "He has made judges dependent on his
will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment
of their salaries. 37 The remedy for this grievance appears in Article
335 U.S.C. §§ 5301-08 (1970).
34 5 U.S.C § 5305(c) (2) (1970), as amended (Supp. I1, 1974).
3 5 
essage from the President of the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 94-233, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2 (1975).
36 5 U.S.C. § 5305(c)(2) (1970), as amended (Supp. MI", 1974).
37Vuch earlier, in 1689, the Convention Parliament deposed James II, declared the
throne vacant, and offered the crown to William and Mary on the condition that they
recognize the Declaration of Rights, the principal document stating the Revolution Settle-
ment. The Act of Settlement of 1701, 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2, completed the Revolution Settle-
ment and provided that judges should hold office during good behavior, that they should
receive ascertained and established salaries, and that they could be dismissed only upon the
address of both houses of ParliamenL
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III, § 1 of the Constitution: "The judges, both of the Supreme and
inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior; and shall,
at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall
not be diminished during their continuance in office."
Hamilton wrote in the Federalist Papers that "the complete inde-
pendence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential"38 and that "next
to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence
of the judges than a fixed provision for their support." 9 He added
that "in the general course of human conduct, a power over a man's
subsistence amounts to a power over his will."40
These ideas were much in mind two hundred years ago. The Con-
stitutions of Massachusetts (1780) and New Hampshire (1784) each
provided:
It is essential to the preservation of the rights of every individual,
his life, liberty, property, and character, that there be an impartial
interpretation of the laws, and administration of justice. It is the right
of every citizen to be tried by judges as free, impartial, and indepen-
dent as the lot of humanity will admit. It is, therefore, not only the
best policy, but for the security of the rights of the people, and of
every citizen, that the judges of the supreme judicial court should
hold their offices as long as they behave themselves well; and that
they should have honorable salaries ascertained and established by
standing laws.41
As so often occurs when looking back at Hamilton's summaries
of what the founding fathers considered when drafting the Constitution,
it seems that every contingency was foreseen and in some way provided
for. Hamilton wrote in the Federalist Papers:
The plan of the convention accordingly has provided that the judges
of the United States "shall at stated times receive for their services
a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continu-
ance in office."
This, all circumstances considered, is the most eligible provision
that could have been devised. It will readily be understood that the
38 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 521 (C. Van Doren ed. 1945) (A. Hamilton) [hereinafter
cited as FEDERALIST].
39 Id. No. 79, at 528.
40 Id.
41 Similarly, the Constitution of Maryland (1776) provided:
ET]he independency and uprightness of Judges are essential to the impartial admin-
istration of justice, and a great security to the rights and liberties of the people;
wherefore the Chancellor and Judges ought to hold commissions during good be-
haviour; ... salaries, liberal, but not profuse, ought to be secured to the Chan-
cellor and the Judges, during the continuance of their commissions, in such man-
ner, and at such times, as the Legislature shall hereafter direct, upon consideration
of the circumstances of this State. No Chancellor or Judge ought to hold any
other office, civil or military, or receive fees or perquisites of any kind.
[Vol. 51:380
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fluctuations in the value of money and in the state of society rendered
a fixed rate of compensation in the Constitution inadmissible. What
might be extravagant to-day, might in half a century become penu-
rious and inadequate. It was therefore necessary to leave it to the
discretion of the legislature to vary its provisions in conformity to the
variations in circumstances, yet under such restrictions as to put it out
of the power of that body to change the condition of the individual for
the worse. A man may then be sure of the ground upon which he
stands, and can never be deterred from his duty by the apprehension
of being placed in a less eligible situation. The clause which has been
quoted combines both advantages. The salaries of judicial officers
may from time to time be altered, as occasion shall require, yet so
as never to lessen the allowance with which any particular judge comes
into office, in respect to him.
[W]ith regard to the judges, who, if they behave properly, will be
secured in their places for life, it may well happen, especially in the
early stages of the government, that a stipend, which would be very
sufficient at their first appointment, would become too small in the
progress of their service.4
Thus, the drafters avoided fixing a permanent salary and pro-
hibited its diminution during continuance in office. Yet there seemed
to be no feasible way to provide a guarantee that a "penurious and in-
adequate" and "too small" a salary be increased with certainty, unless,
as has been suggested," Article III, § 1 of the Constitution prohibits
diminution of compensation as measured by purchasing power.
It was recognized that legislative control over needed increases in
judicial salaries was a threat to judicial independence. Madison wrote:
It is equally evident, that the members of each department should
be as little dependent as possible on those of the others, for the emolu-
ments annexed to their offices. Were the executive magistrate, or the
judges, not independent of the legislature in this particular, their in-
dependence in every other would he merely nominal. 4
Hamilton added:
The Executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of
the community. The legislature not only commands the purse, but pre-
scribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are
to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over
either the sword or the purse ....
It proves incontestably, that the judiciary is beyond comparison the
weakest of the three departments of power; that it can never attack
with success either of the other two; and that all possible care is
requisite to enable it to defend itself against their attacks. It equally
42 TaE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 529.
43 Timm, February 10, 1975, at 74.
4 4
TH FEDERALIST No. 51, at 347.
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proves, that though individual oppression may now and then proceed
from the courts of justice, the general liberty of the people can never
be endangered from that quarter .... And it proves, in the last place,
that as liberty can have nothing to fear from the judiciary alone, but
would have every thing to fear from its union with either of the other
departments; that as all the effects of such a union must ensue from
a dependence of the former on the latter, notwithstanding a nominal
and apparent separation; that as, from the natural feebleness of thejudiciary, it is in continual jeopardy of being overpowered, awed, or
influenced by its coordinate branches .... 45
The creation of the Commission on Executive, Legislative and
Judicial Salaries40 was a sound step in the direction of maintaining the
separation of powers even though the legislature retains the ultimate
control over the purse. An independent commission appointed by all
three branches would recommend salary adjustments in the top posi-
tions in all three branches to the President, and the President would
recommend adjustments to the Congress for legislative action. The
device broke down in 1973-74 when the President delayed the entire
process for a year and then ignored the commission's recommendations;
and when Congress ignored the President's recommendations for fear
of political reprisals at the polls. Senator Hugh Scott, the Senate minor-
ity leader, said on March 6, 1974:
We fail to do justice to others because we fear to do justice to
ourselves. The Senate has screwed up the system, avoided the just
and postponed the inevitable.47
And Hamilton foresaw it all nearly two hundred years ago:
And we can never hope to see realized in practice, the complete
separation of the judicial from the legislative power, in any system
which leaves the former dependent for pecuniary resources on the
occasional grants of the latter.48
The system contemplated by the commission procedure might yet
be salvaged if salaries of the judicial (and possibly the executive)
branch were to be considered by a separate commission from that which
would recommend legislative salary adjustments. So long as one com-
mission packages its recommendations for all three branches in one re-
port to the President, and so long as the President sends his recommen-
dations in one package to the Congress, Congress obviously will not
open the package and act upon the recommendations for each branch
individually.
45 TH FEDERALIST No. 78, at 520-21.
46 2 U.S.C. §§ 351-61 (1970). See text accompanying notes 2-13 supra.
47 N.Y. Times, March 7, 1974, at 1, at 17.4 8 FEDERALIST No. 79, at 528.
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CONGRESSIONAL SALARIES ARE NOT COMPARABLE
TO JUDICIAL SALARIES
There is no possible way in which to equate judicial salaries with
congressional salaries.
In the first place, there is a sizeable disparity in age between mem-
bers of the judiciary and members of the legislature. Representative
Jerome R. Waldie (D. Cal.) said at the time the Nixon salary plan
was voted down: "I wasn't making this much money when I came to
Congress and I suspect I won't make as much when I leave."49 Al-
though Representative Waldie was 49 years old when he made that
statement, a great number of his colleagues are much younger. A sur-
vey of the House of Representatives of the 94th Congress showed that
the average House member is 49 years old. Twenty percent of the
representatives have not yet celebrated their 40th birthday-"
We took our own survey of the 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, and
compared the average age of all members with all federal judges then
sitting. The results were tabulated as follows:
Representatives - 52
Senators - 57
District Court - 61
Court of Appeals - 65
Supreme Court - 67
The average age of congressmen was 53 years and the average age of
judges was 63 years, a 10-year difference at the peak of financial
productivity.
Of the 435 members of the 94th Congress, 225, or 52 percent,
have law degrees or are admitted to practice law. One hundred eighty-
four, or 42 percent, were actively practicing law when first elected.
Most of the remainder were in the communications industry, banking,
manufacturing, marketing, retailing, or agriculture. Although being a
congressman is a full-time pursuit, there is no requirement that a mem-
ber give up his prior occupation. A lawyer-congressman can continue
his practice, taking care only that he does not participate in fees from
cases involving the federal goverenment. Income from his law prac-
tice is limited only by the amount of time he can devote to it. The
same is true of any businessman-congressman who is in a position to
4 9 N.Y. Times, March 1, 1974, at 27.
50 Chicago Sun-Times, Jan. 16, 1975, at 42.
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A judge, on the other hand, can not practice law. 1 He can not
serve as an officer, director, manager, advisor, or employee of any busi-
ness ;52 he can not serve as an executor, administrator, trustee, guardian,
or other fiduciary, except for a member of his family;53 he can not act
as an arbitrator or mediator.5 4
He can only "write, lecture, teach and speak." 55 Because of the
ethical limitations on what he is able to write or speak about, as a prac-
tical matter he is constrained rather tightly to the language of Canon
4A of the Code of Judicial Conduct: "He may speak, write, lecture,
teach, and participate in other activities concerning the law, the legal
system, and the administration of justice."
Since he cannot, with propriety, speak or write upon very many
controversial issues, the judge is not much in demand on the remunera-
tive college-campus speaking-circuit or elsewhere. Law reviews do not
pay for articles and legal treatises are seldom best-sellers.
On the other hand, in 1974 all senators earned $927,371 for mak-
ing speeches, or an average of $9,273 per senator for speaking fees or
honorariums. In 1973, 63 senators received a total of $1,0S7,413, and
189 House members reported receiving $210,619 in honorariums. 56
As part of the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of
197 4 ,
57 the following section was added to the elections and political
activities chapter of the criminal code :"8
51ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, No. 5F.
52 Id. No. 5C(2).
53 Id. No. 5D.
54 d. No. 5E.
55 Id. Nos. 4A & 5A.
56 The ten highest recipients of honorariums in the Senate for 1974 and 1973 were:
1974 1973
Baker (R. Tenn.) $49,150 $34,350
Proxmire (D. Wis.) 46,278 38,625
Hatfield (R. Ore.) 45,677 33,250
Humphrey (D. Minn.) 40,750 65,650
Hughes (D. Iowa) 35,450
Jackson (D. Wash.) 34,350 39,575
Talmadge (D. Ga.) 32,165
Inouye (D. Haw.) 29,550
Muskie (D. Me.) 28,880 34,976
Brooke (R. Mass.) 28,700
Abourezk (D. S.D.) 49,425
Goldwater (R. Ariz.) 44,733
Dole (R. Kan.) 38,150
Eagleton (D. Mo.) 36,950
Sources: 1974 information: N.Y. Times, May 18, 1975, at 117; 1974 information: PARADE,
November 3, 1974, at 25.
57 Pub. L. No. 93-443, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Title I, § 101(f) (1).
58 18 U.S.C. § 616 (1970).
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determine how much time he can devote, and when it can be devoted,
to his business or agricultural interests.
Whoever, while an elected or appointed officer or employee of
any branch of the Federal Government-
(1) accepts any honorarium of more than $1,000 (exclud-
ing amounts accepted for actual travel and subsistence expenses)
for any appearance, speech, or article; or
(2) accepts honorariums (not prohibited by paragraph (1)
of this section) aggregating more than $15,000 in any calendar
year;
shall be fined not less than $1,000 nor more than $5,000.
This provision will prevent the top honorarium recipients in Congress
from receiving more than $15,000 per year, but it permits receipt of
substantially more than the average honorariums previously received
by congressmen.
It is almost impossible to determine from the Legislative Branch
Appropriation Act of 1975 what each congressman is entitled to in the
way of expenses, inasmuch as lump-sum appropriation figures are used,"9
but one investigative reporter has calculated the amounts as follows :6
In addition to an annual salary of $42,500, each House member
receives $227,220 to hire staff assistants, $6500 for stationery, re-
imbursement for 26 round trips back home, two free newsletters mailed
to constituents and the "franking" privilege for virtually unlimited
first-class mail plus $1140 for air-mail and special postage.
Other perquisites include more than 500 free hours of long-dis-
tance telephone calls from Washington plus unlimited long-distance
calls in district offices, $5500 for office equipment, $3400 for the main-
tenance of each district office-and a generous retirement plan. Sen-
ators receive comparable allowances, although they vary with the pop-
ulation of the state the Senator represents. 61
Similarly, Americans for Democratic Action have reported after a study
that the benefits and special privileges for each member of the House
total $488,505 per year.2
The $6,500 stationery fund of each representative, for example,
can be put to personal use without accounting, or may be accumulated
59 Pub. L. No. 93-371, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 13, 1974).
6 0 Walters, How Some Congressmen Tap Extra Funds, PA ADE, August 24, 1975, at 8.
The article relates to the practice, more prevalent in the House than Senate, to maintain
funds "secretly given and secretly handled," known as office funds or newsletter funds similar
to the 1952 Nixon fund.
61 The top allowance for staff assistants for a Senator was $586,160 in 1973. U.S. NEws
& WoRLD REPORT, July 16, 1973, at 24.
62 Chicago Sun-Times, August 25, 1975, at 11.
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from year to year.63 In the first six months of 1975, 76 former mem-
bers of the House took their accumulated allowance in cash with them
into retirement. Representative H. R. Gross (R. Iowa), for example,
took $23,611.55 in stationery funds with him into retirement.6 4
Congressional fringe benefits less readily measurable include free
emergency medical services and free drugs prescribed by Capitol physi-
cians; access to a cut-rate barber shop; government supplied recreational
services including steam room with masseurs and physiotherapy and
swimming pool; reduced-rate meals ;65 loan of art works by the National
Gallery of Art; furnishing of a selection of live plants (three small plants
per month and one large plant bimonthly) and the loan of others for
special occasions by the United States Botanic Garden; atlases and
other reference materials as gifts or long-term loans, and free speech
writing services by the Library of Congress; a mounted wall map of a
congressman's home state provided by the Postal Service; up to 2,000
wall calendars per congressman provided by the Capital Historical Soci-
ety; scenic photographs from the National Park Service; a free shipping
trunk once a year; and (for some congressmen) free newspapers and
magazines through committee payment.66
There are also tax benefits enjoyed by congressmen. A $3,000 a
year tax deduction is allowed by statute for living expenses in Wash-
ington. 7 In October 1975, the House Ways and Means Committee
voted to amend its tax equity legislation to more than double the maxi-
mum possible deduction ($6,600 or more) that congressmen may claim
for living expenses in Washington."
It may very well be that all congressmen, and certainly a great
many of them, are worth more than they are paid. The point is that
because of the many differences in their situations, their salaries can-
not be equated in any way with judicial salaries. In order to avoid the
continuing tying together of these oranges and apples, a separate com-
mission should recommend judicial salaries.
63 This is not true of senators. Their stationery allowance is part of a package of ex-
penses which must be accounted for by voucher, and accumulated but unused money goes
back into the Senate funds.
64 Chicago Tribune, September 29, 1975, at 6.
65 Chicago Sun-Times, August 25, 1975, at 11; U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, July 16,
1973, at 24.
66 Chicago Sun-Times, March 8, 1975, at 57.
67 2 U.S.C. § 31c (1970) ; 26 U.S.C. § 162(a) (1970).
6 8 N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1975, at 25.
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WHAT LIES AHEAD?
Since March 1969, when judicial salaries were established at $42,500
for courts of appeals judges and at $40,000 for district judges-
-The Consumer Price Index has increased over 50 percent.
-General Schedule white-collar federal employees have received
38.1 percent comparability pay increases as well as 14.2 percent step
increases for an aggregate pay increase of 52.3 percent.
-Salaries of state chief judges have increased 44.2 percent.
-Attorneys' salaries have increased 43.9 percent.
-Top officials in the private sector have received salary increases
of 59.8 percent. 9
Even if judicial salaries were adjusted for completely compensa-
tory cost-of-living increases or for comparability, courts of appeals
judges will have sustained a non-recoverable loss of $56,830 and dis-
trict judges of $53,480.70
Based upon this data, the Committee on Judicial Compensation of
the Judicial Conference of the United States concluded that "economic
considerations, fairness and concern for the quality of the judiciary
warrant a federal judicial salary increase of not less than 50 percent.' 1
Expenditures for the United States Courts in 1900 represented
one-half of one percent of the support of the government as a whole.
In 1975, the courts' share of the whole had declined to about one-
thirteenth of one percent. Thus, although the cost of the support of
the courts has increased absolutely, relative to the cost of the support
of the government as a whole it has greatly decreased. '2
69A privately printed study prepared for the Judicial Conference Committee on Judi-
cial Compensation, A Case For an Immediate Salary Increase For Federal Judges 1-2 [on
file with the INDIANA LAW JOURNALI.
70 Id. at 1.
71 Id. at 3. Compensation of courts of appeals judges from 1911 to the present has been
as follows:
Years Since Percentage
Date Established Salary Last Increase Increase
Mar. 3, 1911 $ 7,000
Feb. 25, 1919 8,500 8 21.4
Dec. 13, 1926 12,500 7 47.0
July 31, 1946 17,500 20 40.0
Mar. 2, 1955 25,500 9 45.7
Aug. 14, 1964 33,000 9 27.8
Feb. 14, 1969 42,500 5 28.7
Oct. 1, 1975 44,600 6 5.0
72
Year U.S. Courts U.S. as Whole Courts as
1900 $ 2,392,574 $ 520,860,847 0.5
1975 235,092,000 304,400,000,000 0.08
Id. at Appendix H .
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The cost of a 50 percent increase in federal judicial salaries for an
entire year would be about $16 million, or less than the cost of one
military aircraft.73 On one day in October 1975, the President and
Secretary of State met with Portuguese Foreign Minister Antunes and,
with no debate or sounding of public opinion or discussions with Con-
gress, authorized $85 million in emergency economic aid as "a first
step" in significant assistance for Portugal. 74
During the period in which there have been no salary increases
(1969-1975), federal court filings have increased by 50 percent and
difficult cases (those taking at least twice as much time as the average
case) have increased by more than 300 percent. Yet case terminations
per judge have increased by one-third and the processing time has de-
creased substantially. Even with the greater workload, federal judges
are performing at a level of high quality and doing more work and
doing it more efficiently than in 1969. 7
The Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate Sys-
tem, established by Congress76 and consisting of 16 members, four
appointed from the Senate, four from the House, four by the President,
and four by the Chief Justice, in its report dated June 20, 1975, wrote:
Considerations of fairness also compel us to add our voice to those
who are calling for an increase in judicial salaries. More, however, is
at stake: It is imperative that the opportunity for service on the fed-
eral courts attract lawyers of the highest quality. Despite rampant
inflation, the salaries of federal judges have not been adjusted since
1969. We recommend that federal judicial salaries be raised to a
level that will not deter outstanding individuals from accepting ap-
pointment to the bench and that will adequately compensate those
now serving.77
It is difficult to attack such reasoning. In the determination of com-
pensation levels for members of the federal judiciary it is imperative
that all concerned remember that what is fundamentally in issue is the
quality and independence of the federal courts.
73 TIME, October 6, 1975, at 38, interview with Israeli Defense Minister Shimon Peres:
"A military aircraft that cost $1 million ten years ago costs $20 million today."
74 N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1975, at 11.
75 Study, supra note 69, at 2-3.
76 Pub. L. No. 92-489, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct. 13, 1972).
77 COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTIR
AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE 65 (1975).
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